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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Conclusion
Traditionally, the apportionment remedy had been limited to
totally unproductive realty. The reluctance to expand this remedy
to include unproductive personalty has, at present, been largely
overcome. At the same time, the theory extending apportionment
to underproductive property has received greater extrajudicial ex-
pression and support. It is this latter issue of underproductivity,
however, with which the New York judiciary and the legislature
have been loath to deal, possibly due to the formidable practical
problems asociated with it. The adoption by the courts of a test
which grants apportionment of the proceeds from the sale of
those assets which have become substantially unproductive would
resolve, in a practical and sound manner, the theoretical inconsist-
ency which exists in limiting apportionment to totally unproductive
property.
THE FTC AND TELEVISION:
A NEW RULE FOR MISREPRESENTATION BY TEST
AND DEMONSTRATION
The Federal Trade Commission was established to further
the national interest by preserving and promoting a free enter-
prise economy, the natural development of which was being hampered
because of increasing disregard for ethical conduct in the market
place.' Among the chief armaments available to the Commission
is Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act which renders
unlawful "unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce .... 12 Recently, the
Commission invoked this section and found deceptive a televised
commercial which, in purporting to prove the moistening qualities
of a shaving cream through an actual demonstration of its ability
to soften sandpaper, substituted a mock-up of sand adhered
to plexiglass. While momentarily conceding the product to be
in fact capable of softening sandpaper, the following rule is implied
1 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 717, 15 U.S.C. §41(1958) ; Moore, Deceptive Trade Practices and the Federal Trade Commission,
28 TENN. L. REV. 493, 494 (1961). See Note, The Regulation of Advertising,
56 COLUm. L. REv. 1018, 1019 (1956).2Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938, 52 Stat. 111, 15 U.S.C. §45 (1958).
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in the opinion: Mock-ups, props or simulated demonstrations,
purporting to prove or otherwise establish the truth of a claim
made with respect to the product advertised, are unlawful mis-
representations, notwithstanding the product in fact possesses
the qualities alleged, if the tendency is to induce the viewer to
believe he is seeing one thing when instead he is seeing another.3
The obvious significance of this ruling lies in its application
to the television advertising industry, chief user of the mock-up
form. A more subtle but no less meaningful analysis indicates
that this decision represents the natural consequence of an evolving
judicial interpretation of section 5, and a clear indication of the
Commission's attitude regarding novel forms of misrepresentation
which may be devised in the future. However, critics of the
Commission have labeled the ruling an extension of the FTC's
regulatory authority to include representations not reasonably de-
scribable as "unfair or deceptive" within the meaning of section 5.4
This note will attempt to resolve that issue by examining the scope
of section 5 in terms of: 1) the common law which prompted
its passage, 2) the level of public sophistication at which the act
is aimed, 3) the traditional defenses available to the advertiser,
and 4) the unique problems presented by misrepresentation in
television advertising.
Historical Background
At common law, a purchaser who found himself deceived by
his vendor generally had to settle for such relief as was afforded
by one of three civil actions available, i. e., fraud and deceit,
breach of warranty or rescission of the contract. It gradually
became apparent that these remedies were ill-suited to the needs
of a rapidly industrializing society. The traditional actions were
concerned with reparative measures rather than preventive ones.
Further, even when available, a prima facie case was difficult to
establish since it was quite susceptible to a failure of proof.
For example, in the action of fraud and deceit a purchaser had
to establish a misrepresentation of fact, knowingly made by the
vendor with the intent of inducing reliance, and on which the
purchaser as a reasonable man relied, to his actual damage.5
Similar difficulties had been encountered under both the com-
mon-law 6 and statutory actions for breach of warranty. For
3 Colgate-Palmolive Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 15643 (FTC Dec.
29, 1961).
4 See Advertising Age, Jan. 8, 1962, p. 1, col. 4; id. Jan. 15, 1962, p. 1,
col. 4.
GPRossER, TORTS § 86 (2d ed. 1955).
6 Chandelor v. Lopus, 1 Jac. 1, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (K.B. 1603).
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the most part, the privity of contract doctrine prevented recovery
against the manufacturer, who was fast becoming the real sales-
man. And, although the local retailer continued to transfer title
to the goods, 7 he was relieved from liability because of not having
made the misrepresentation.8 The inequities of this situation became
particularly evident in the face of growing national advertising
by manufacturers.
Rescission was the third, and perhaps least effective, of the
traditional remedies. The unique problem posed by this action
was that the goods purchased had to be in a returnable condition,
a highly impractical requirement for consumables and noncon-
sumables alike.9
The injuries wrought by deception and misrepresentation are
not confined to the purchaser alone. A competitor also stands
to receive significant harm. Traditionally, an action for unfair
competition' 0 has been his legal remedy. Case law has fairly
well established that a misrepresentation to the public by one
manufacturer vests no cause of action in his competitor absent
the violation of a property right," e. g., the typical palming-off
situation which involves the dilution of a trade name. However,
very often the injury suffered by competitor A which results from
a misrepresentation to the public by competitor B is substantial
notwithstanding the absence of a palming-off element. Thus, a
false claim by competitor B, which induces a consumer to buy,
deprives competitor A of a potential customer. Further, when the
falsehood is discovered by the consuming public, it may depress
generally the market for that item. In such a case, although
an injury is clearly present there is no traditional cause of action
to which it may be attached. The situation is one of damnum
absque injuria which leaves competitor A without redress. Clearly,
the diversion of business is the real ground for complaint, whether
or not there happens also to be a violation of a property right
for the court to consider in satisfaction of its requirement. The
7 See Pease & Dwyer Co. v. Somers Planting Co., 130 Miss. 147, 93 So.
673 (1922).
8 See Handler, False and Misleading Advertising, 39 YALE L.J. 22,
25-27 (1929). Although § 12 of the Uniform Sales Act provides that any
affirmation of fact or promise with respect to the goods has the effect of
an express warranty, reliance and privity must be proven. See also Note,
29 CoLuM. L. REv. 805 (1929); N.Y. PEas. PROP. LAw §§ 93-97, 150.
9 See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1463 (rev. ed. 1936).
10 See, e.g., G. W. Cole Co. v. American Cement & Oil Co., 130 Fed. 703
(7th Cir. 1904); Pennsylvania Cent. Brewing Co. v. Anthracite Beer Co.,
258 Pa. 45, 101 AtI. 925 (1917).
IlAmerican Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (6th
Cir. 1900).
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reasonableness of allowing recovery in such a situation is present,
although there is no palming-off.12
Within this context, Congress passed the FTCA of 1914,
intended to mitigate these inequities, many of which had become so
firmly established as to be incapable of modification without direct
statutory intervention. As originally enacted, section 5 was
confined to "unfair methods of competition." 13 Interpreting this
phrase in FTC v. Raladam Co.,'4 the Supreme Court held that
for a misrepresentation to fall within the prohibitions of the
act it must result in an injury to competition. As a result
of this decision pressure was applied on Congress to broaden
the meaning of section 5 so that misrepresentations would also
be actionable when the only effect was to produce injury to the
public.'5 Consequently, in 1938 the Wheeler-Lea amendment ex-
panded section 5 to read "unfair methods of competition . . .
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices. ... 16
Statutes framed in terms of "unfair or deceptive" are no more
readily susceptible of comprehension than the concept of proximate
cause.' 7 The question is one of interpretation.' 8 What is deceiving
to the credulous may be nothing more than humorous to the
sophisticated. Therefore, before a representation can be called
deceptive in the first instance, regardless of defenses, it is necessary
12judge L. Hand stated, in Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co.,
7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927),
that the law traditionally did not recognize such forms of injury as action-
able because the difficulties of proving damage prevent just determination.
See Grismore, Are Unfair Methods of Competition Actionable at the Suit of
a Competitor?, 33 MicH. L. REv. 321, 322-33 (1935), in which the author
answers his proposition in the affirmative.
1338 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §45 (1958).
14283 U.S. 643 (1931).
15 Moore, Deceptive Trade Practices and the Federal Trade Commission,
28 TENx. L. REV. 493, 497 (1961). See Note, The Consumer & Federal
Regulation of Advertising, 53 HARv. L. R-v. 828, 837 (1940).
1652 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1) (1958) (emphasis added).
"[T]here are two general purposes. . . .The first is to broaden the powers
of the Federal Trade Commission over unfair methods of competition by
extending its jurisdiction to cover unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce. The second.., is to provide the Commission with more effective
control in the exercise of its jurisdiction over false advertisements of food,
drugs, devices, and cosmetics." H.. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1937). False advertising is defined as "misleading in a material
respect" in 52 Stat. 116 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (1958), and is con-
fined to the four categories mentioned, labeling excepted. Control by the
Commission over false advertising in other areas is derived from section 5,
which confers a general authority over all forms of deception. 83 CoNG.
R1c. 398 (1938).
17 See Paossa, ToRTs § 47 (2d ed. 1955).
IsSee dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in FTC v. Gratz, 253
U.S. 421, 436-37 (1920).
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to determine what level of public intellect section 5 contemplates as
the standard.
Disregard of the Reasonable Man Concept
Earlier cases arising under the FTCA seemed prepared to
confine the protection afforded by section 5 to the reasonable
man. In Ostermoor & Co. v. FTC 19 the petitioner, a mattress
manufacturer, pictorially displayed his product to illustrate the
resiliency of the filling. A mattress was shown with a tear in the
covering and the filling material flaring out several feet. The
Commission alleged that, if any of the petitioner's products were
torn open, the filling would not bulge more than half a dozen
inches; and that based on the public's belief that the petitioner's
product was particularly resilient, its sales had increased to the
detriment of competitors who made no such misrpresentations. The
court held: "In our judgment this pictorial representation . . .
even though exaggerated as to their characteristics, cannot deceive
the average purchaser .... 1"20 The standard at this point, if
one may be drawn from this frequently cited holding, is that
misrepresentations must be clear, literal and are to be measured
against the average purchaser.
A decade later the Supreme Court handed down an opinion
in FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y 2 which was markedly more
sympathetic toward the FTC. It had been alleged and found
by the Commission that the respondent was guilty of misrepresenta-
tion in purporting to distribute free encyclopedias, accompanied by
a charge to cover a supplemental looseleaf service, when actually
the charge covered both items. The Court said:
There is no duty resting upon a citizen to suspect the honesty of those
with whom he transacts business. Laws are made to protect the trusting
as well as the suspicious. The best element of business has .. . decided
that honesty should govern competitive enterprises, and that the rule of
caveat emptor should not be relied upon to reward fraud and deception. 22
The preceding holding served to set the pace for a line of
subsequent interpretations of the amended section 5 which seem
to have lowered still further the level of public sophistication
to be considered as the proper object of protection under section 5.
19 16 F2d 962 (2d Cir. 1927).
20 Id. at 964. In Consolidated Book Pubs., Inc. v. FTC, 53 F.2d 942,
962 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 553 (1932), a Commission order
was vacated because it appeared no ordinary purchaser could be misled.
21302 U.S. 112, rehearing denied, 302 U.S. 779 (1937).22 1d. at 116. See also FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483
(1922).
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In General Motors Corp. v. FTC,2 3 Judge A. Hand was quick
to recognize this trend, and said:
It may be . . . that only the careless or the incompetent could be misled.
But if the Commission ... thinks it best to insist upon a form of advertising
clear enough so that, in the words of the prophet Isaiah, "Wayfaring men,
though fools, shall not err therein," it is not for the courts to revise their
judgment.24
Thus, the fictional reasonable man is no longer a standard
to be used in applying section 5; in his place appears the more
careless and credulous element of our society.
Defenses to Misrepresentation Under Section 5
An allegation by the Commission of deceptive practices auto-
matically draws either or both of two common-law defenses to
complaints of that nature-puffing and expressions of opinion.
Properly speaking, both defenses are opposite sides of the same
coin. Thus, "puffing . . . is considered to be offered and
understood as an expression of the seller's opinion only, which
is to be discounted as such by the buyer, and on which no
reasonable man would rely." 25  The theory underlying puffing
as a defense rests on the distinction between objective and subjective
representations. Objective representations are susceptible to some
degree of proof or disproof; all those which are not are subjective.
For example, "Eight out of ten users have said . . ." is objective,
while "that our cleaner has everything . . ." is subjective. A
glue that "holds like iron," a facial cream which "restores youth-
ful radiance," and a tonic to make one feel "like a new man,"
are all subjective expressions.2 6 These and similar superlatives
have been traditionally classified as permissible trade puffery.27
The argument most often relied on to justify this classification,
accepted with declining enthusiasm more recently, is that sub-
jective representations are not of a nature to produce reliance
on the part of a reasonable buyer and hence are not deceptive in
23 General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
312 U.S. 682 (1941).24 Id. at 36.
25 PROSSER, TORTS § 90, at 557 (2d ed. 1955).
26 See Handler, The Control of False Advertising Under the Wheeler-
Lea Act, 6 LAw & CONTEreP. PROB. 91 (1939).2
7Id. at 95-99. To the extent that a manifested opinion is evidence
of a state of mind it is of course objective and relevant to the issue of good
or bad faith, but since at the present time good faith is no defense to
deceptiveness the distinction is more academic than significant. See Note,
The Regulation of Advertising, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 1018, 1025-29 (1956).
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nature.28  It has also been urged that reasonable latitude in
puffing products is a prerequisite to effective selling.29
It is at once seen that such arguments, although sufficient
for the common-law situation, should not prevail when the reason-
able man standard has been discarded. An early case 30 realizing
this inapplicability concerned the manufacturer of a foundation
cream for facial make-up who used "Rejuvenescence" as a trade
name. The product was advertised as containing organic ingredients
capable of bringing to the user's skin "clear radiance . . . the
petal-like quality and texture of youth," which gives the skin "a
bloom which is wonderfully rejuvenating . .. ."3 The Com-
mission objected to the trade name "Rejuvenescence" as conveying
to the purchaser a belief that the product would renew youth.
Quoting from Standard Educ. Soc'y, the court refused to accept
any reference to a reasonable man standard and interpreted the
act as affording protection to the ignorant, the credulous and
the unthinking. To the petitioner's contention that the word
signified nothing more than nondeceptive boasting and fancifulness,
the court quoted the "wayfaring men, though fools" standard of
Judge Hand.32
It might well have been argued that the manufacturer's
representations fell within the previously sacrosanct category of
superlative representation called puffing. Certainly, "Rejuven-
escence" is not appreciably distinguishable from expressions like
"amazing distance" and "perfect lubricant" which had earlier been
justified as permissible puffing by another circuit.'3
At this point it could have been anticipated that one court
would find it deceptive to say a preparation "stopped" itching,
3 4
and that another would object to "stop bedwetting," a both on
the ground that the negative implies a cure. Nor was it un-
expected that a third would enjoin "Favorite of the Stars" when
used in conjunction with "Hollywood" because of the implied
testimonial and place of origin .3  When the latter court attempted
several years later to withdraw from this rather protective position
it was reversed.3 7 The case involved a cushion-insert foot sup-
28 Handler, supra note 26, at 97-99.
29 See H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1937).
30 Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d. 676 (2d Cir.
1944).
31 Yd. at 678.
32 Id. at 680.
33 Kidder Oil Co. v. FTC, 117 F.2d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 1941).
34 D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1942).
35 Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960).36 Howe v. FTC, 148 F.2d 561, 562 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 741
(1945).
37 Sewell v. FTC, 240 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'd per curian, 353
U.S. 969 (1957).
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porter, advertisements of which the Commission had found de-
ceptive in that they misled the public to believe "everyone can enjoy
better posture," and that the inserts were "especially designed to
help you." A majority of the court sustained these nonscientific
portions of the ad on the ground that substantial evidence es-
tablished that there were many benefited and contented users.
The dissent, apparently ratified by the Supreme Court, said the
import of the Commission's complaint was not that some or
many had or had not been pleased with the product but that
the advertisement implies all users will be benefited, whereas such
claims were not justified on the evidence. 38
The defense of puffing has been further weakened by rules
promulgated by the FTC, which govern the use of words such
as "free," "guaranteed" and "price." 39 Nonconforming, use of
these words in a way which it is felt is unfair or deceptive will
subject the infringer to charges under the act. The same result
is likely to obtain from a violation of the Commission's Trade
Practice Conference Rules, which are applicable to all significant
industries and indicate what claims are not to be made for a
product, what information should be revealed in advertising
programs, etc.40
Nor is there a guarantee that superlative words found un-
objectionable in one context will be so found in another. "Perfect,"
for example, was declared permissible puffing and "easy" was held
a true factual representation as applied to a weight-reducing plan.
41
However, "easily" has been disallowed when applied to the use of
a home weaving kit,42 and "perfect" would be an unfair trade
practice if used to describe diamonds which fell below standards
set by that industry, according to FTC rules.43
Occasionally respondents have turned to dictionaries in an
effort to justify misleading representations, but a defense of literal-
ness, if it ever did obtain, certainly does not today. In P. Lorillard
Co. v. FTC,44 the court sustained a misrepresentation charge by
the Commission even though the objectionable claim, that the
respondent's cigarette contained less nicotine and tar than any other
leading brand, was literally true. The Commission had found
that the claim would be interpreted by the public as a representation
that smoking the respondent's cigarettes would be less injurious
to the health than smoking those of its competitors, whereas the
3 8 Id. at 236.
39 16 C.F.R. §§ 18.8, 18.11, 18.10 (1960).
40 16 C.F.R. § 16 (1960).
41 Carlay Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1946).42 Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957).
43 16 C.F.R. § 23.27 (1960).
44 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950).
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difference in nicotine and tar content was too negligible to be of
any significance.
Based on the foregoing, it seems clear that the deceptive
nature of glittering superlatives-trade puffery-is not tested as
it was at common law. The question is no longer what tlhe
reasonable buyer has a right to rely on, but rather, what the
credulous buyer does rely on. Today, if an automobile man-
ufacturer advertises that his product gives "thirty-five miles to
the gallon" and comes "completely equipped," he may not expect
to avoid FTC objections by arguing that during a three-mile
controlled test his automobile did average thirty-five miles to the
gallon, or that no one should expect a heater to be stock equipment.
For a manufacturer to say he does not expect a buyer to rely on such
representations smacks of hypocrisy. It seems axiomatic that the
small-town dealer is not anxious to waste his time on talk, nor
the large manufacturer his money on advertising, without expecting
these representations to have an inducive effect on the buyer.
Recent cases indicate that in passing on puffing as a defense,
the courts have displayed a marked affinity for this line of
reasoning. The question now arises: have the courts undergone a
similar change in attitude when the representation has been defended
as merely an expression of opinion?
The argument has traditionally been made that a misrepresenta-
tion must be of fact; and that if one makes a good faith repre-
sentation of opinion, of a nature which cannot be proven false,
then there has been no misrepresentation.
The landmark case accepting this distinction between fact
and opinion, American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,4 5
occurred prior to the FTCA under a postal regulation prohibiting
use of the mails for fraudulent schemes. The issue involved was
whether or not solicitation of customers is fraudulent where the
petitioner's business is the mental healing of "diseases and ailments
of the human family and teaching the science of healing.... 46
The Supreme Court, referring to the conflicting schools of thought
as to whether the mind alone may be the source of physical
ailments, stated:
Both of these different schools of medicine have their followers. . . . But
there is no precise standard by which to measure the claims of . . . this
mental theory. . . . That [it is false] cannot be averred as a matter of
fact . . . and it is not possible to determine as a fact that those claims are
so far unfounded as to justify a determination that those who maintain them
and practice upon that basis obtain their money by false pretenses... 47
45 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
46 Id. at 96.
47 Id. at 106-07.
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Some twenty years later the lower courts were still of the
same attitude. In L. B. Silver Co. v. FTC 48 the court, citing
American School, reversed an FTC factual determination on the
theory that where experts disagree a representation cannot be
condemned unless it is made to cover an actual fraud. In turn,
both cases were soon after relied on to justify a similar result
in Raladam Co. v. FTC,49 which held that representations made as
to the scientific character and safety of a tablet advertised as an
obesity cure were statements of opinion and not fact, and hence
could not be banned. The Raladam decision is clear in its im-
plication that, absent fraud or bad faith, opinions cannot result
in unlawful representations. The court stated that words such
as "scientific" and "safe" have no absolute meaning and are not
to be so taken by the public.50
While more recent cases appear to affirm this traditional
common-law position, they nevertheless consistently uphold Com-
mission determinations of misrepresentation based on factual
evaluation of professional testimony. One example is Koch v.
FTC,51 in which the Commission brought an action against a
manufacturer who claimed to sell a remedy with curative values
for cancer, leprosy, malaria, all infections, insanity, etc. The
petitioner produced numerous doctors and scientists whose opinions
supported the product's effectiveness. A similar array of experts was
presented by the Commission. In the face of evenly divided profes-
sional testimony, the court upheld the Commissioner on the ground
that an opinion, if given so as to imply to the public that it is a
fact, loses its protected classification.
52
Several years later this attitude was carried further in a
case which moved through the courts for over eleven years.
53
The Commission bad held that since "Carter's Little Liver Pills"
did not stimulate the production of bile, use of the word "liver"
was a misrepresentation. Here too, the petitioner urged a conflict
of medical opinion as a defense. The court said, however, that
it was up to the Commission to decide if the totality of evidence
refuted the medical opinions advanced by petitioner's expert
witnesses.
5 4
The change in attitude which had come about since American
48289 Fed. 985, motion to recall mandate denied, 292 Fed. 752 (6th Cir.
1923).
4942 F2d 430 (6th Cir. 1930), aff'd on other grounds, 283 U.S. 643
(1931).
501d. at 432-33.
51206 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1953).
52Id. at 318.
53 Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 884, rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 921 (1959).
5 Id. at 498.
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School and Raladam was neatly summed up in a Seventh Circuit
ruling sustaining the Commission's findings of misrepresentation
as to the curative powers of hair and scalp-treating kits.55 The
court said that whether or not there exists a medical consensus,
and if so, to what effect, is a question of fact; and that it is
also a question of fact whether or not a preparation is as effective
as claimed. Therefore, the Commission was justified in finding,
even though there existed conflicting expert testimony, that the
product in question did not possess the medical virtues represented.
It hardly seems arguable, following decisions as broad as the
above, that "opinion". in its traditional sense poses any significant
barrier to the FTC short of the first amendment itself.
This constitutional problem was raised several years following
the Wheeler-Lea amendment to section 5. In Scientific Mfg. Co.
v. FTC,56 the petitioner was the president and controlling stock-
holder of a closely held family corporation engaged in the pub-
lishing business. He was a registered pharmacist of some twenty
years experience and had arrived at an honest belief in the
detrimental effects of consuming food which had been stored
in aluminum containers. When he began to publicize his views
in pamphlet form, the Commission charged him with distributing
false and misleading statements to the injury of the public and
business. Drawing on the Supreme Court's opinion in the Raladam
case the court held that the unfair acts must emanate principally
from traders in commerce or others materially interested in the
trade, stating:
If . . . given any broader scope, the Act would relate to far more than
trade practices and the Commission would become the absolute arbiter of
the truth of all printed matter moving in interstate commerce. . . . The
Constitutional inhibition of any such abridgement . . . [justifies] rejection
of the Commission's contention. 57
But the court admitted without hesitation that even expressions
of honest opinion, if wanting in proof, are enjoinable when
utilized within the trade to deceive the public or to harm com-
petition. It cited with approval an earlier decision 58 which had
enjoined a stainless steel cooking utensil distributor from cir-
85 Erickson v. FTC, 272 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
940 (1960); accord, United States v. Kaadt, 171 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948).56124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941).
57 Id. at 644.
5SPerma-Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941). Another
interesting case, E. F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 969 (1957), involved an oleomargarine manufacturer
who advertised his product in terms such as "churned . . . sweet creamy
goodness," "country fresh [as] . . . our other dairy products." The Court
said "There is no constitutional right to disseminate false or misleading
advertisements." Id. at 740.
[ VOL. 36
NOTES
culating the same pamphlets which had prompted the Scientific
Mfg. Co. litigation. It is to be noted that this interpretation of
the act does not go to the nature of the representation-opinion-
but only to its source, i.e., from one neither materially interested
nor engaged in trading.5 9
At the present time it seems quite arguable that if common-
law concepts of puffing and expressions of opinion were ever
properly applicable as a measure of the Commission's authority
under section 5 they are much less so today. Particular words
or acts are not sacrosanct, nor are opinions used in trade; they
may all be found deceptive if phrased in a way which misleads,
or has a tendency to do so. The question in all cases will be
determined by the Commission. In those instances where a
"defense" of puffing prevails it is not because the answer is
sufficient as an affirmative defense in the legal sense, such as
performance in a contract action; but rather, because the Com-
mission has found that the act or statement is not unfair or
59 A requirement of the act is that actions brought by the Commission
be "to the interest of the public." 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §45(b)
(1958). The absence of this element has been occasionally set up in the form
of an affirmative defense. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929), represents
the first commanding interpretation. In overruling an FTC determination,
Mr. Justice Brandeis said that the test is something more than mere mis-
apprehension or confusion on the part of the public. The traditional
suit by a private trader to enjoin passing-off requires a showing that the
purchaser has been deceived. The element of public protection is incident
only to the enforcement of a private right. Under section 5, however, pro-
tection afforded to private parties is the incidental element, while public
protection becomes the primary concern. Public interest may exist even
where no private right has been violated, however the public interest must
be specific and substantial, and not merely a collateral concern to the
enforcement of private rights. Further, although the injury to any one
person might be too insubstantial to justify litigation, sufficient public
interest may still be present. If it appears at any time that the action is
no longer maintainable in the interest of the public then the Commission
must withdraw, and the courts, should the Commission seek enforcement,
must refuse. Id. at 27-28. See FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212,
216-17 (1933).
Recent decisions have given a liberal interpretation to the Klesner
dictum. Addressing itself to the public interest issue, one court said:
"[T]hat the deception may be remedied before the customer has suffered any
more pecuniary loss than the price of a postage stamp does not foreclose
the Commission from acting to proscribe it in the first instance." Ex-
position Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 873 (2d Cir. 1961). The court
went on to say that it is not in a position to foresee the Commission's
particular objective in instituting a given proceeding. The court indi-
cated that the Commission believes "this proceeding is a step forward
in the attainment of a higher morality in the great mass of information
and propaganda designed to influence the public." Id. at 873-74.
This interpretation of public interest leaves little to be desired by the
Commission and should not in the future be a significant obstacle to the
Commission's functioning.
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deceptive in the first instance. "Puffing" and "opinion" as used
today appear to be nothing more than a means of cataloguing
those complaints which the Commission and courts find insufficient
in themselves, just as the ground for dismissal might be "no
showing of interstate commerce" or "not in the interest of the
public." In lieu of "puffing" equally indefinite expressions such
as "insignificant," "irrelevant," or "inconsequential," might instead
be chosen. When the courts dismiss a request for enforcement
they have merely concluded that the representation is not deceptive
even to the most credulous. This is quite apart from any finding
that although the representation may create a false picture in
the minds of some it is excusable because such persons have no
traditional right to rely thereon or because the respondent has a
right to so represent, regardless of reliance. This appears to have
been the prevailing attitude of the FTC when television was born
as a new advertising vehicle.
Misrepresentation in Television Advertising
Misrepresentation in television in its broad sense is like
misrepresentation in any other medium, whether it be newspaper,
radio or personal interview. The same principles have carried
over into the young industry, so that the average deceptive repre-
sentation, if filmed and reproduced on television, would generally
be no more excusable. 60 This is not to say that these principles
are exclusive. A substantial percentage of misrepresentations oc-
curring in television are by test and demonstration. This form
of misrepresentation has a limited practical application outside
that medium and hence has seldom been previously considered.
It is because authoritative precedent was lacking that the "sand-
paper" case, setting forth as it does a new rule covering future
televised tests and demonstrations, is particularly significant to the
television advertising industry. But, admitting the rule itself
to be new, the question then presented is: Does the same hold
true for the reasoning behind it, or should the rule have been
60 See, for example, In the Matter of Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 7660,
FTC, March 9, 1961. A complaint issued charging deception in advertise-
ments, both printed and televised, regarding the effectiveness of a dental
cream. It was alleged that in representing that the product formed a "pro-
tective shield" around teeth, the respondent implied complete protection against
tooth decay, but in fact neither complete protection nor a protective shield
resulted from application. The parties entered into a stipulation which ad-
mitted that complete protection was not offered by the product, but the
respondent denied that such representations had been made. In finding against
the respondent, the Commission looked to the effect of the representation,
whether in print or televised, and made no attempt to distinguish on the
grounds of .the medium involved.
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predicted as a natural consequence of presently existing and
generally accepted principles?
The first significant decision dealing with televised demonstra-
tions occurred in 1959 when the Commission moved against an
automobile polish manufacturer who had been advertising his
product in dramatic fashion.61 A filmed demonstration showed
the following: The respondent's polish was applied to an auto-
mobile which was then covered with gasoline. The gasoline was
ignited and after a few seconds the flame was doused with
water, leaving the surface of the automobile as shiny as before.
The commentary accompanying this demonstration emphasized the
protective qualities of the wax under what was called a "hot to
cold" test.
The Commission charged that although the respondent was
representing his wax to be heat and cold resistant, the demon-
stration given as proof was in fact no proof of the claim. The
hearing examiner felt it was not the Commission's function to
determine what the demonstration did or did not prove, but only
the truth or falsity of the quality claimed. Therefore, since the
FTC had not challenged the qualities themselves, he concluded that
no issue had been raised.
On appeal the Commission pointed out that section 5 con-
tained no such limitation. A complaint which charges only that
a demonstration does not prove what it is represented as proving
is sufficient, regardless of whether or not the product fulfills its
claims. In arriving at this decision analogy was made to mis-
representations by way of false indorsements, which do not go
to the question of the ultimate quality of the product, but which
are nonetheless misrepresentations because they induce purchases
based on the consumer's belief that such indorsements have been
given. "The law is well settled," the Commission said, "that the
public is entitled to buy what it thinks it is buying, in this case, a
product which has been subjected to a test which demonstrates
that it imparts a finish which is both heat and cold resistant." 62
61 In the Matter of Hutchinson Chem. Corp., No. 7140, FTC, June 11,
1959.62 Id. at 3. The Commission's motives, in moving against an advertiser,
are not confined to the protection of purchasers but are also concerned with
competitors' business interests.
In the Matter of Eversharp, Inc., No. 7811, FTC, Sept. 3, 1960. The
respondent attempted to prove the safety of its razor by drawing it and
then a competitor's razor, which was no longer in production, across the
face of a boxing glove. Whereas the respondent's razor did not damage
the surface, the competitor's left in its wake a slash the length of the stroke.
The complaint alleged that the demonstration "has the tendency and capacity
to unduly frighten and alarm prospective purchasers of competitive razors
with respect to consequences which may result from the use of . . .
competitive razors. ....
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On turning to the merits the Commission found the evidence
insufficient to support the complaint. However, soon after this
action was dismissed the same line of reasoning was invoked in a
later case with more success.
A cigarette manufacturer attempted to prove that the filter
used in his product absorbed and retained more tars and nicotine
than filters used by other cigarettes currently on the market. 3
The televised demonstration involved two test tubes with filters
lodged in each, one being the respondent's and the other made
by a competitor. A dark fluid was slowly poured into each tube;
the result was that the competitor's filter became supersaturated
before the respondent's, so that the fluid began to "run through"
and deposit in the bottom of the test tube.
The complaint charged that the filter test did not prove the
filter's effectiveness against tars and nicotine, and was therefore
a misrepresentation. On hearing, an agreement containing a
consent order was entered into and the respondent ceased its
demonstration without appeal. 64  Thus, a rule previously developed
in a matter ultimately dismissed for lack of evidence, was invoked
a year later to entice a consent agreement.
The foregoing rulings were all in effect when the "sandpaper"
case came before the Commission. The controversy involved the
following: An announcer claimed that he had a shaving cream
for men with really heavy beards, beards tough as sandpaper,
and that because of its superior moistening quality his product
would actually allow sandpaper to be shaved clean. As proof
63In the Matter of Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 7688,
FTC, Feb. 24, 1960.64Accord, In the Matter of Standard Brands, Inc., No. 7737, FTC,
June 1, 1960. A producer of oleomargarine was charged with representing
that "moisture drops" appearing on its product and visible to viewers, which
were added to the margarine prior to televising, proved its product tasted
more like butter than competitive margarines.
The Commission's expanding interpretation of section 5 has also resulted
in a broadening of the scope of its orders. In Standard Brands the order
prohibited references to moisture drops only; in Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., supra note 63, all deceptive representations regarding the
effectiveness of its filter were prohibited; and in In the Matter of Aluminum
Co. of America, No. 7735, FTC, March 3, 1961 (involving a televised
comparison of the respondent's aluminum foil after a period of use and that
of a competitor), the order was to refrain from any untruthful statement
or representation regarding either its own or its competitors' products.
In this connection the Supreme Court has said: "Commission orders
are not designed to punish for past transactions, but are . . . a means for
preventing 'illegal practices in the future.' If the Commission is to attain
the objectives Congress envisioned, it cannot be required to confine its road
block to the narrow lane the transgressor has traveled.... ." FTC v.
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952). See also Jacob Siegel Co. v.
FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611 (1946).
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of this claim he offered a demonstration. The announcer spread
a quantity of shaving cream onto a surface which he represented
to be sandpaper but which was instead plexiglass covered with
a moderately adhesive layer of sand. Seconds later he used an
ordinary razor to whisk a clean swath across the mock-up and
again referred to this demonstration as proof that his product would
shave the sand from sandpaper, and was therefore equally effective
on the heaviest beard.
The Commission conceded that if the product was effective
on sandpaper it would likewise be effective on a tough beard.
It further assumed, contrary to its ultimate finding, that the
product was as effective a moistening agent as claimed. The
critical issue was then presented: May a televised commercial
utilize a test or demonstration to dramatize a quality the product
actually possesses if the test or demonstration is simulated without
the knowledge of the viewer?
This issue is more incisive than those presented in either
the "cigarette filter" or "automobile polish" cases. In those
matters the question extended only to whether or not the tests
would prove the qualities claimed. Here, the Commission mo-
mentarily assumed the quality alleged and the validity of a
sandpaper test as proof. Its ultimate concern was whether or
not a test otherwise valid as proof of a claim is rendered deceptive
by a substitution of material.
In finding the use of a mock-up to be deceptive, the Com-
mission pointed out that the very purpose of representing the
demonstration as a test was to convince any skeptics among the
viewing audience who, without seeing, would not believe. The
respondent knew that, without such visible proof, a significant
number of viewers would not have been induced to buy. The
Commission's reply was as follows:
The difference between telling and not telling the truth could, in this instance
at least, have been the difference between an effective and ineffective "sell."
In such circumstances, the claim of "harmless exaggeration" is rather
hollow. 66
The precise principle promulgated by the Commission is present
in the variety of cases which hold that an advertiser cannot rely
on dishonest testimonials, 66 imply a false source or origin for
65 Colgate-Palmolive Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. Ir 15643, at 20481
(FTC Dec. 29, 1961).66 In Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 883 (1960), the petitioner was engaged in the manufacture and sale
of electric cooker-fryers. His appliance used a small Westinghouse brand
thermostat. It was alleged and found that petitioner was unfair and
deceptive in predominantly displaying a Good Housekeeping Guaranty Seal
which had not been awarded his product, and equally deceptive in displaying
1962]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
his product,67 or fail to disclose that his product, although as
good as new, is in fact reprocessed.6 8 "The vice assailed in these
cases is the use of a falsification of fact, extrinsic to the objective
value of the product, to sell that product, whether or not it may
deserve to be bought on its own merits." 69
It is fairly apparent that had the viewer merely been told
that the shaving cream would shave sandpaper, or that the
demonstration was a mock-up and did not in fact prove what it
purported to prove, the inducive effect would have been diminished.
The viewer's motivation turns on the belief that he has witnessed
an actual demonstration and not something less. Regardless of
the product's ultimate quality, a sale results which would not have
consummated had there been no misrepresentation. Thus, the
basic question to be asked is: Would the viewer have hesitated
in buying had he known the truth? If the answer is affirmative,
as the Commission found above, then the test is deceptive within
section 5.70
Of the three main defenses relied on in the "sandpaper"
case, two apply particularly to television. First, the respondent
the name Westinghouse so as to imply that the entire appliance was a
product of that manufacturer. See also Lighthouse Rug Co. v. FTC, 35
F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1929) and Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. v. FTC,
122 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941) for the proposition that the use of labels or
trade names in a way which tends to mislead is within the act's prohibition.
671n United States Navy Weekly, Inc. v. FTC, 207 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir.
1953) the court sustained the finding of a misrepresentative and deceptive
tendency in the use of petitioner's name for an unofficial and privately owned
publication. Nor would the court accept, in the alternative, use of a
statement such as "Not owned by the Government" appended to the title.
68In FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 77-78 (1934), the
Supreme Court reiterated its belief that substitution is unfair, even if
equivalent. The respondent lumber company sold western yellow pine
under the trade name of California white pine, a wood of different origin
and higher quality. Although the facts were otherwise, the Court assumed
that both woods were of equal value and practical use. Mr. Justice Cardozo
said: "Saving to the consumer . . . does not obliterate the prejudice ...
The consumer is prejudiced if upon giving an order for one thing, he is
supplied with something else. . . . In such matters, the public is entitled
to get what it chooses, though the choice may be dictated by caprice or by
fashion or perhaps by ignorance. . . Nor is the prejudice only to the
consumer. Dealers and manufacturers are prejudiced when orders that would
have come to them if the lumber had been rightly named, are diverted
to others. . . ." Id. at 78. See Mohawk Ref. Corp. v. FTC, 263 F.2d
818 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 814 (1959).
69 Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 65, at 20480-81.
7O1bid. "Perhaps some consumers will be content with a product pur-
chased in response to such a deceptive 'come-on,' but that is hardly legal
justification for it. It could not atone, for example, for the injury to a
competing . . . manufacturer whose product might have fared better . . .
had respondents adhered to honest and fair advertising practices." Id. at
20481.
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claimed that limitations imposed by the nature of the medium
made mock-ups necessary, i. e., sandpaper does not photograph
realistically. The Commission summarily dismissed that contention,
stating it was "patent nonsense" for an advertiser to think that
he could take liberties with the truth, while sponsors employing
other forms, such as newspapers or personal interviews, must
be truthful. In effect, the second defense was that if all mock-
ups are to be considered unlawful the practical consequences would
be crushing to the entire television industry. This defense was
characterized by the Commission as a parade-of-horrors argument.
The Commission's disposition of the latter argument has been
criticized in some circles for lack of clarity, 1 but a perusal of
the decision would seem to obviate this criticism. There is no
fault to be found with a false street setting in a western drama,
nor is there any objection to having the hero pour tea from
a whiskey bottle. Here there is no attempt to sell either the
backdrop or the brand of whiskey used by the hero. Even further,
it is not objectionable per se during a coffee commercial to pan
across a breakfast table incidentally showing as steaming coffee
that which is really wine. If the view were a close-up, however,
and the announcer were to emphasize the full-bodied flavor, deep
color and rich appearance, this would constitute a deception. The
question is one of degree and emphasis. In the latter case the
sponsor would be attempting to demonstrate the virtues of his
product by substituting an essential-rather than an insignificant-
element of the commercial. "The difference in all these cases is
the time-honored distinction between a misstatement of truth that
is material to the inducement of a sale and one that is not." 72
In rejecting the respondent's remaining defense of puffing,
the Commission cited several standard definitions, 7 3 and defined
puffing as a representation which must be exclusive of mis-
statements of material fact. But it appears from a reading of
those authorities that several might have been cited with equal
force by the respondent. The real key, it would seem, lies
in the Commission's conception of exactly what is meant by "the
high duty of preventing public deception," with which it considers
itself charged.7 4
Set among the previously evolved principles which today govern
the application of section 5, the "sandpaper" rule appears justifiable.
71 Advertising Age, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 94, col. 2.
72 Colgate-Palmolive Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ir 15643, at 20482
(FTC Dec. 29, 1961).
73 See, for example, Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106 (5th Cir.
1945), that puffing is a reference to an expression of opinion not intended
as a representation of fact. PROSSER, ToRTs § 90 (2d ed. 1955).
74 Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 72, at 20479.
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The doctrine of caveat em ptor no longer applies 75  and the
protections afforded by the act extend to "the ignorant, the un-
thinking and the credulous . .. " 761 There is no requirement
that the Commission sample public opinion in determining what
meaning a representation conveys to the public.77 If it is found to
be ambiguous the presumption is that the most deceptive meaning
is conveyed to the buyer 7 8-although the seller be unaware,79
or the purchaser aware,80 that the representation is false. Since
a showing of fraud is not essential,8' good faith is no defense; 82
since tendency to deceive is the test,8 3 no actual deception is
necessary.8 4 Literal truth is no defense s5 in such situations, and
there may even be an affirmative duty to speak when silence
might be deceptive. s6
Conclusion
If most early federal courts tended to deal severely with
the Commission's efforts to undertake what it conceived to be
its administrative duty, later cases have taken a more sympathetic
view. To what extent this trend is attributable to statutory
mandate, 7 a growing acceptance of administrative agencies and
75 National Silver Co. v. FTC, 88 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1937).
76 See Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165'(7th Cir. 1942).
77 E. E. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 969 (1957); Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382 (7th
Cir. 1953), re'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 940 (1955).7 8 United States v. 95 Barrels of Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438 (1924); Rhodes
Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, supra note 77.
79 Gimbel Bros. v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1941).
8OFTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922). In FTC v.
Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934), the Court said that it would be
possible for a misrepresentation, repeated long enough, to cause a secondary
meaning to attach, which, once it became as firmly rooted as the primary,
would not fall within the act's prohibitions. But until the secondary
meaning is as secure in the mind of the public as the original, "each
new transaction ... is a repetition of the wrong." Id. at 80.8sFTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., supra note 80, at 81.
82 See Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960).
83 FTC v. Hires Turner Glass Co., 81 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1935).8 4 Ibid.; Feil v. FTC, supra note 82.
85 Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F2d 369 (10th Cir. 1943); Kalwaitys v.
FTC, 237 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025 (1957).
86Mary Muffet, Inc. v. FTC, 194 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1952), requiring
a manufacturer of rayon goods to label them to prevent their being retailed
as silk goods; L. Heller & Son v. FTC, 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951),
prohibiting the sale of imported goods until labeled to indicate their foreign
origin.
87Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 237, 246, 5
U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1010 (1958), which provides that an agency's factual de-
terminations will not be set aside unless there is a lack of substantial evidence,
discernible from the record as a whole, to support such determinations.
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their quasi-judicial function, or a belated realization of the broader
purposes behind the FTCA, is difficult to judge. Whatever the
reason, the judiciary has shown a certain empathy with the
Commission to the extent that the above general rules have become
crystallized during recent years.
The new ruling appears to be nothing more than an ex-
press acknowledgement of the fact that the consumer does rely
on tests and demonstrations, whether or not he has a traditional
legal right to do so. It is a realistic rule which admits to the
frailties of human nature and recognizes that the passage of the
FTCA was prompted by a similar admission. Certainly the ad-
vertiser is aware of consumer motivation. If he were not, there
would have been little need for legislation. Is it therefore un-
reasonable to warn an advertiser, who exploits the consumer's
reliance on tests and demonstrations, that he shall be no more
deceitful in presenting the proof which induces the sale than in
alleging the quality itself?
ORGANIZATIONAL AND RECOGNITION PICKETING:
PERMISSIBLE ACTIVITY UNDER THE LANDRUM - GRIFFIN
AMENDMENTS
The Labor Management Relations Act [hereinafter referred to
as the Act] insures to employees "the right to self-organi-
zation . . . [and] to bargain collectively through represent-
atives of their own choosing . . . and to refrain from any
or all such activities ... ." 1 To further secure these rights,
the Act was amended in 1959, and several new unfair labor
practices, restricting certain union activities, were incorporated
therein.2 One of the new provisions, Section .8(b) (7) (C) of the
1 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 61 Stat.
140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Taft-Hartley].
For two cases which construe the purpose of the act see NLRB v. Red
Arrow Freight Lines, Inc., 213 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Scullin
Steel Co., 161 F2d 143 (8th Cir. 1947).2 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-
Griffin Act) § 704(c), 73 Stat. 544, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (Supp. II, 1961)
[hereinafter cited as Landrum-Griffin]. For a good discussion of the 1959
amendments to the act see Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN L. REv. 257 (1959). An excellent
analysis of the entire Landrum-Griffin Act is found in Aaron, The Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L. REV.
851 (1960).
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